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Abstract In this paper, the goal is to investigate the nature of freedom enjoyed 
by participants in collective agency. Specifically, we aim to address the fol-
lowing questions: in what respects are participants in collective agency able to 
exercise freedom in some weaker or stronger sense? In what ways is such col-
lective or common freedom distinct from the freedom ascribed to individuals? 
Might there be different sorts of freedoms involved in and tolerated by collec-
tive agency, each of which has its own role in determining the nature and effi-
cacy of the bond uniting its participants? Clarification of just what such free-
dom may involve and how it subsists within collective agency is not only im-
portant for being able to demonstrate the instrumental value of social ontology 
to contemporary political debates. It may likewise contribute an important di-
mension to the descriptive psychology of collective agency and shared inten-
tionality, which is an approach deserving of more attention. Here, such clari-
fication is undertaken via a comparison to the notions of freedom at stake in 
the respective accounts of sociality and collective agency provided by Raimo 




Some recent papers (Tollefsen 2014; León and Zahavi 2016) have taken 
issue with how contemporary researchers in social ontology seem to neglect 
“the experiential dimension” of human “capacity to share intentions” (ibid., 
220). The lack of regard for the “experience-based aspects” (León and Zahavi) 
or “qualitative aspects” (Tollefsen) of this sharing threatens to call into ques-
tion the depth and robustness, if not the very philosophical importance, of the 
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models of sociality advanced by such research. Because prominent social the-
orists such as Bratman, Gilbert, and others tend to focus on the “propositional” 
or “normative” dimensions of sharing phenomena, they risk saying very little 
about what such forms of intentional sharing “actually [amount] to” (ibid.). 
The question, then, is whether explanations of experiential sharing can go fur-
ther than statements, à la Searle, that collective intentions “involve ‘a sense of 
us’ and of ‘doing something together’” (ibid.). León and Zahavi, for their part, 
see an opportunity for remedy of this oversight in exploring in detail the “re-
sources” available within the phenomenological tradition concerned with so-
cial phenomena. 
If the preceding may be correctly understood not only as a warrant for 
their own methodology but also as a call to be taken up, the goal in this paper 
will be to investigate this so-called experiential dimension of collective agency 
via one particular line of inquiry. Namely, we wish to explore whether this 
experiential dimension in collective agency might also include or involve a 
sort of freedom that may be enjoyed by participants in collective agency. We 
want to find out in what respects participants in collective agency may be able 
to experience a kind of freedom that is consonant with and made available by 
participation in collective agency. The phenomenon we aim to point at here is 
not simply the “disjunction condition”, as thematised by Gilbert (2009, 172), 
which has to do with how, at any given moment, an individual ought to be able 
to distinguish between his or her own intentions, actions, and ends and those 
of the group (e.g. plural agent) of which they are part. That would only amount 
to a kind of freedom from the collective or apart from the collective. Rather, 
we mean to indicate a question having to do with the possibility of a sort of 
freedom within collective agency. Indeed, might there even be different sorts 
of freedoms involved in and tolerated by, or perhaps even requisite in, collec-
tive agency, each of which has its own role in determining the nature and effi-
cacy of the bond uniting its participants? Our contention is that clarification of 
just what such freedom(s) may involve and how it may be experienced and 
structured within collective agency will not only be important for being able 
to demonstrate the instrumental value of social ontology to contemporary po-
litical debates. It may likewise contribute an important dimension to the de-
scriptive psychology of collective agency and shared intentionality. 
Even if it is granted such an account of freedom within collective agency 
might constitute an interesting desideratum, it cannot be taken out of hand that 
there are grounds for thinking that such a thing exists or ought to be accounted 
for. It should be noted that, barring a few notable exceptions (Hindriks 2007; 
Pettit 2001), such questions about freedom within collectives has garnered rel-
atively little attention in contemporary discussions of social ontology, and has 
Bull. anal. phén. XVI 2 (2020) 
https://popups.uliege.be/1782-2041/ © 2020 ULiège BAP 
 
114
seemed more of a matter for philosophers with an orientation towards political 
concerns (Kramer 2003; Cohen 1991). From a certain perspective, this is un-
derstandable. Given the varied and sometimes incompatible current theories 
as to what unites or is shared by collective agents, it seems natural that most 
attention would be given to how, within collectives, individuals are bound or 
united in agency, that is, how certain forms of ‘unfreedom’ (sometimes dis-
cussed as relational or normative constraints within collective agency) charac-
terise and condition collective agency. All the same, this is not to say that no 
one has ever come close to considering such a problem. To a great extent, one 
cannot put forward an account of what binds or constrains collective agency 
without at the same indicating, even if only in a backhanded fashion, what 
allows them to some degrees of unboundedness. However, in those few cases 
where questions of freedom have been explicitly broached within social ontol-
ogy, this seems largely to have been done from the perspective of whether 
collective freedom could be reducible (or not) to individual freedoms. For in-
stance, Hindriks (2007) argues contra Cohen that maximal individual freedom 
cannot be either a necessary or sufficient condition of what he describes as 
corporate freedom (i.e. for the freedom of a group/ collective agent), and that 
corporate freedom can likewise be independent of individual freedoms. While 
Hindriks does this by examining some useful thought experiments in social 
ontology, he does not shed much light on what it might like for any group 
members to experience such corporate freedom, nor on what sorts of partici-
patory and agentive intentions that experience might involve. 
Hence, given this apparent lack of attention, what might be some rea-
sons for thinking that there could be such kind of freedom within collective 
agency? What could be the basis of the suspicion — ours, at least — that its 
omission from discussions of the nature of collective agency is not without 
certain risks? One kind of basis for this question can be found if we consider 
some recent work by Butterfill, in which he puts forward an account of the 
type of planning and coordination (“parallel planning”) that in his view best 
characterises “alpha” (true, paradigmatic) collective agency (Butterfill 2015). 
Even while depicting his aim as primarily being about capturing the features 
of such “alpha” collective agency (152, 165), Butterfill nonetheless seems 
open or at least neutral with regard to the claim that not all phenomena of col-
lective agency may be created equally. There may be in other words “degrees” 
of collective agency, and one ought not rule out a pluralism of collective 
agency, even if accounting for such is not one’s explicit aim (as in Butterfill’s 
case). In the context of his argument, by “degrees of collective agency” what 
Butterfill seems to have in mind are different tolerances for either coercion (by 
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one agent of another) or fortuitousness to factor into, and not be the nullifica-
tion of, collective agency (152). Here, however, we may append a query 
whether there may be other compelling manners of understanding such “de-
grees of collective agency”. With respect to the role of planning in collective 
agency, for instance (Butterfill’s topic in that article), we may well wonder 
whether not all forms of collective agency permit of exactly the same forms of 
flexibility and do not rely upon the same degrees of coordination or planning. 
If that is plausible, then on our view there might be some variance of un-
plannedness within the coordination and cooperation that characterises collec-
tive agency, for instance under the guise of flexibility or creativity, available 
to collective agents. Moreover, even if we are entitled to extrapolate from this 
observation and derive from it a notion of freedom within collective agency, 
one may still wonder whether any and all sorts of freedom enjoyed by partici-
pants in collective agency stops there. For instance, is the freedom within col-
lective agency determined chiefly with respect to the goal or object of that 
agency (how ambiguous or clearly defined it is, how simple or complex it is), 
or might participants avail of another sense of freedom still, apart from how 
uncoordinated or creative their shared action turns out to be? 
We can put more of a point on these questions and their motivation with 
the aid of an example. For instance, on a grey, rainy morning, a commuter 
takes an abrupt, painful-looking tumble down some slippery cement stairs. A 
group of other commuters interrupt their journeys and gather around this per-
son and try to help him. One person gathers the things that the fallen person 
has dropped; another makes sure he doesn’t move, lest he might have injured 
his neck or spin. One woman phones for an ambulance, while a fourth goes to 
see if the station might offer a first aid kit. What is going on in this type of 
situation, where we have a group of people gathering to help a fallen com-
muter? In the first place, it does seem like there is a plausible case here of 
collective agency; this is insofar our good Samaritans are not being coerced 
into helping, and seem to share the same goal, namely, of helping the fallen 
person. Moreover, they seem to be working and coordinating together in order 
to reach that goal1. Yet we might wonder about what other features might be 
                                                     
1 Further caveats may be raised here on whether our example satisfies a well-defined 
and effective constraint condition such as to constitute an instance of collective 
agency. These may include the fact that in our examples such participants lack com-
mon knowledge of each other, may not check plans with each other and that the set of 
participating agents is not fixed beforehand. On our view, such concerns would restrict 
the domain of phenomena of collective agency implausibly, because the boundaries 
would be too narrow.  On such caveats and constraint conditions for phenomena of 
collective agency, cf. Paternotte 2014, 107. 
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attributed to how they are going about reaching that goal. Insofar as they form 
a group of people helping someone, does each of them primarily feel somehow 
constrained in their actions by this group? And if that is the case — as might 
seem likely to some — does that then exhaust what each person is able to feel 
as the ‘we-feeling’ one might have in the group, namely, a sharing of a goal or 
plan which constrains each individual? 
In the ensuing, the attempt will be to explore these questions via a com-
parison to the notions of freedom at stake in the respective accounts of collec-
tive agency provided by Raimo Tuomela and Jean-Paul Sartre. There are a 
couple reasons for thinking that juxtaposing these two authors and their ap-
proaches to these questions might be fruitful. The first has to do with the meth-
odologies and the conceptual resources each may bring to bear on this prob-
lem. Tuomela may be thought to be highly representative of and also highly 
represented within how contemporary social ontology tackles such issues; Sar-
tre’s approach on the other hand would appear highly idiosyncratic (if not in-
comprehensible) to many a reader today and seems not to attract too much 
attention in the literature. This gulf between them already suggests one issue 
of interest; is the superiority of the one’s approach over the other to be taken 
out of hand, especially when the latter, Sartre, would seem much more aligned 
with the interest in the ‘experiential aspects’ of collective phenomena men-
tioned earlier? The second reason for linking the two, tied to the first, has to 
do with the radically different sorts of answer each arrives at, concerning the 
questions whether and how there might be something like freedom (for partic-
ipants) within collective agency. Could then each of our interlocutors have 
something to say to the other, which might open up a new perspective on our 
problem? Can their differences, in other words, be stimulating for considering 
which of the two might be closer to the truth, in what ways, and why? 
Turning first then to Tuomela, part of the appeal of his account is that 
he provides a many-levelled analysis of the types of cohesiveness evinced in 
collective agency according participants’ intentions or commitments. These 
are accounted for in terms of his notion of different configurations of ‘I-mode’ 
and ‘we-mode’ “we-intentions” and in terms of a distinction between “opera-
tive” and “non-operative” members of collective agency, each of whom has 
different levels of cognition about and authority over a group’s collective 
agency (Tuomela 2007, 2013). On the basis of understanding how Tuomela 
deploys these notions in order to explain collective agency, it can be argued 
that there remains in his account, despite its sophistication, a basic tension be-
tween freedom and collective agency. For the participants within collective 
agency, freedom can only exist and be tolerated within collective agency when 
the latter takes on less coordinated and thus less cohesive forms. On the other 
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hand, for Tuomela, the more the goals or the conditions of collective agency 
call for greater cooperation and cohesiveness, the more such freedoms form a 
threat to that very collective agency. This juxtaposition between group cohe-
siveness and freedom suggests that to cash out this finding in Tuomela, two 
steps will thus be needed. The one is to develop a picture of how Tuomela 
accounts for how group agency comes about (as a kind of cohesiveness), and 
the second is to clarify what sort of role for and meaning of freedom is ac-
corded therein. Basically, what these two steps will amount to is a set of claims 
about how collective agency, when it is truer or more “ideal” collective agency 
according to Tuomela’s terms, has to debar or at least strongly constrain an 
individual’s freedom. 
For Tuomela, as for some others working on social ontology, there are 
basically two factors determining whether collective agency between individ-
uals can come about. The first is quite fundamental but still quite broad, and 
can be linked with what is sometimes discussed as the phenomenon of ‘collec-
tive acceptance’ or collective belief. For there to be anything like collective 
agency, there needs to be shared group reason(s) — a kind of (shared) ethos in 
which goals, values, beliefs, and norms are shared across a number of individ-
uals1. Of course, simply holding certain beliefs, even shared ones, does not 
necessarily lead to action, and this is where a second factor comes into play; 
in order for collective agency to come about, there has to be an intention to act 
which is shared or which is intended in common by some number of individ-
uals. These last are what Tuomela calls ‘we-intentions’, by which he means 
intentions people have to do things which they could only do together with 
other people (hold a debate, play a soccer match) or which they explicitly wish 
or aim to do together (build a boat, clean up a park). These we-intentions are 
thus defined by targeting shared goals that people may act towards; by con-
trast, so-called ‘I-intentions’ are characterised by individual or non-shared 
goals. 
One of Tuomela’s key contributions to social ontology comes at this 
point in the story. Apart from being careful to distinguish between non-shared 
(or non-cooperative) and shared intentions (termed ‘I-intentions’ and ‘we-in-
tentions’ respectively), Tuomela is careful to point out that these shared or we-
intentions that condition collective agency can have different modes, in func-
tion of just the manner in which a person is committed to reaching or acting 
towards that shared goal. On the one hand, a we-intention can have an ‘I-
mode’, in which an individual functions merely as a private person, privately 
committed to a (shared) goal. Thus, as a good Belgian, I can be individually, 
                                                     
1 Cf. Tuomela 2007, 22-23. 
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i.e. privately committed to the shared goal (with a multitude of other Belgians) 
that every Belgian beer be poured in its proper glass. This means, for instance, 
that I act in some way towards that goal. I try to enlarge my glass collection at 
home as much as I can; when I have a beer poured for myself or others, I check 
or request that this ‘rule’ is being followed. However, Tuomela (2007) argues 
there seem to be no or few intersubjective or epistemic requirements involved 
in the effectuation of this we-intention within the I-mode, and this seems plau-
sible; for instance, in being committed to composting as much of our house-
hold waste as possible (a shared goal), I don’t necessarily have to look to, or 
coordinate with, or even communicate with others as I act towards that goal. 
On the other side of this distinction, we have the way that we- or shared 
intentions permit of a ‘we-mode’, and in such cases, argues Tuomela, we can 
see certain more robust or cohesive forms of collective agency occurring. 
These last instances are not a mere aggregate of private commitments to a 
shared goal (as was the case in the former), but appear to involve the following 
features for the we-intention supposedly at work in them: 1° There are certain 
cases of collective agency where, for the individuals holding a certain shared 
goal, each intends to act towards that goal as part of a group acting towards 
that goal. In Tuomela’s terms, this means ‘the group [qua group members] 
intends to do X as a group’. 2° This in turn means that in those cases (of the 
we-mode we-intention) each individual has to be turned towards others with 
whom they share a certain goal, if the individual is to act towards that goal 
with them as part of a group1. 
How to account for this difference between these cases of the I-mode 
and the we-mode? What distinguishes I-mode from we-mode we-intentions? 
What in other words is going on at level of one’s intentionality when one 
would ‘look to’ or ‘coordinate or communicate with’ others in the we-mode 
we-intention? To put more of a point on the matter, behind such a terminology 
on Tuomela’s part, we can clearly discern an agenda to differentiate between 
those sorts of collective agency that have more ‘bond’ or glue within in them, 
and those that have less. So how to account for these greater and lesser quan-
tities of such glue? Echoing a vocabulary made popular by e.g. Gilbert, 
                                                     
1 The we-mode means that when I intend, “that also others (or a sufficient number of 
them) [have to] participate”, this is both a “conceptual and rationality condition for 
one’s intention to participate” (Tuomela 2007, 93). I.e: “The joint action opportunities 
conditions” include “also that the others will participate […]” (ibid.). Tuomela does 
not seem to distinguish closely between ‘joint action’ and ‘collective action’ (cf. 2007, 
123) nor between collective agency and joint agency, as others such as Butterfill might 
(cf. 2015). Whether he is justified in not doing so lies beyond our current scope. 
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Tuomela’s answer is that this depends, at the level of the constitution of we-
intentions, on the kinds of commitments members of collective agency hold. 
These are namely collective commitments and social commitments, and in we-
mode we-intentions they both emerge in a significant manner and appear to 
evince a special relationship. A key explanation of their relationship is the fol-
lowing: 
The social glue and cohesion provided by collective commitment should be 
present and required in these contexts. Part of what is involved here — over 
and above what aggregated private commitments give — is the social commit-
ment involved in collective commitment: being committed to each other, the 
group members can better rely on the others to perform their respective tasks, 
which, especially in the case of interdependent and joint actions, is central. So-
cial commitment to others and to the group is the core of the reproachability 
feature involved in collective commitment: a publicly we-committed member 
who leaves the joint project or intentionally violates the ethos can be criticised 
by the others, whereas if he had been committed only ‘to himself’ he would in 
general have been less criticisable socially for letting the others down (Tuomela 
2007, 37). 
Collective commitment may be thought of a commitment not only to a shared 
goal but also to a shared action, namely, ‘I commit with you to achieve x 
jointly with you, where x is a shared goal’1. Social commitment on the other 
hand, involves a kind of commitment to the others with whom one would share 
an action, i.e. it is ‘commitment to one another to participate to realise x’. What 
is important about their relationship according to Tuomela is that collective 
commitment must entail social commitment. In other words, one cannot be 
committed with another to shared action without at the same time being com-
mitted to that other (to share action, ‘to participate to realise x’).  
‘Collective commitment involves social commitment’, ‘committed 
with, committed to’…; what is going on here? In essence, Tuomela derives 
commitment to one another from the commitment with one another, and makes 
both essential to what he considers to be true, robust, or “ideal” collective 
                                                     
1 Without explicitly stating as much, Tuomela seems to hint at one point that collective 
commitments seem to involve something like a promise (2007, 36). There is at least a 
question here for Tuomela on how much or how necessary speech acts or social acts 
may be involved in collective commitments. It should also be noted that collective 
commitments can be shown in different ways and to different degrees; again, in 
Tuomela’s terminology, a non-operative group member (a non-decider) can show col-
lective commitment in a weak sense despite failing tacitly to accept the group inten-
tion, namely through the mere fact of their functioning within the group (2007, 96). 
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agency. His reasoning on this point runs as follows: from collective commit-
ment there devolves to each participant a set of reasons to act, constituting their 
respective roles, tasks, and ‘parts to be done’ within the shared goal, and such 
members have to be able to rely on the others, “especially in the case of inter-
dependent and joint actions” (2007, 37). This creates a situation where en-
forceability and “reproachability” for such roles and tasks (or failing them) is 
a key presumption of the collective commitment1. On Tuomela’s view, each 
person cannot truly and faithfully commit to realise something together (‘with 
one another’), unless each person can rely on others and hold them accountable 
for their roles (‘to one another’). In other words, for one individual to commit 
with another…there have to be “social oughts and mays” in place to which 
those individuals are also committed; these are namely rights and duties which 
gives individuals reasons to act in a group, as a group member2. This notion of 
collective commitment “involving” or containing social commitment thus 
forms the backdrop on which Tuomela develops his notion of “group-social 
normativity,” which he distinguishes from ‘normativity proper,’ e.g. “moral, 
legal, prudential (etc.) normativity” (2007, 27).3 
However, an important question remains here; one might well still won-
der about the grounds on which such rights and duties could be generated, let 
alone enforced or reproached. On the basis of what sort of ‘glue’ or bond could 
                                                     
1 It is both a “conceptual” and “rational” presumption according to Tuomela; the agent 
cannot understand their commitment without this reproachability, nor could the col-
lective commitment be expressed or intended in the first place without it (Tuomela 
2007, 104). 
2 “Social commitments assumed to be entailed by collective commitments” are a kind 
of “social normativity,” having the form of “social ‘oughts’ and ‘mays’” (Tuomela 
2007, 27).  
3 Cf. Tuomela 2013, 252. In our view, the status and the significance of normativity in 
Tuomela’s account remains a fraught question. On the one hand, given the explicit 
distinction he makes between “proper normativity” and “group-social normativity”, 
the literature tends to classify Tuomela as a “non-normativist” on collective intention-
ality (Gomez-Lavine and Rachar, 2019, 98; Schmid, 2009, 42). On the other, it is dif-
ficult to conceive of what Tuomela could mean by such “group-social normativity” 
and by the idea of “social oughts and mays” if these notions are not based to a large 
extent on some version of ‘normativity proper’. For instance, it seems Tuomela would 
invite a host of problems if “group-social normativity” were to be framed as a type of 
epistemic or semantic normativity. In an important note, Tuomela (2007, 260, note 53) 
even seems to go so far as to concede this, stating that his notions of social and collec-
tive commitments exhibit a “functional” resemblance to the role they play in a norma-
tive account à la Gilbert. 
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other participants in the collective action be reproached when failing to con-
form to these rights and duties (especially given that we cannot call upon any 
external moral framework in order to account for them)? Such grounds cannot 
come from or be met by the ‘group ethos’, the first condition of collective 
agency according to Tuomela, for (among other reasons) as we have seen such 
ethos can be shared ‘privately’, i.e. within the I-mode1. The answer for 
Tuomela has to do with how, in collective agency, we have to be as much 
committed to each other as to our shared action and our shared goal: “being 
committed to others [e.g. the social commitment, B.V.], we can better rely on 
others to perform their respective tasks… Social commitment to others and to 
the group is the core of the reproachability feature involved in collective com-
mitment” (ibid., 37). In other words, in true collective agency, each person and 
their actions has to be open to scrutiny by others.   
A useful perspective for understanding this point about how collective 
agency involves different kinds of commitments is offered if one reflects on 
how such agency seems to have a kind of transparency (with and to others) as 
a requirement (ibid., 38). As in our example from the train station, when people 
are acting together towards a shared goal, not everyone can be doing every-
thing at once, and it makes sense for each person to be aware of what the others 
are doing, in order for each person and the shared action to be effective. The 
sort of transparency we are referring to here may then be thought of a kind of 
monitoring which follows from what Tuomela frames as the “collectivity con-
dition” of collective agency, namely, that all participants in the collective 
agency must be equally satisfied with the status of fulfilment of the shared goal 
of that agency2. This monitoring reflects quite a high cognitive loading on the 
part of all the participants in the collective agency, because each person has to 
be aware of what the others are doing in function of their roles and also of the 
extent to which each other participant’s actions are adequate to reaching the 
shared goal. It is also cognitively demanding from a dynamic perspective; it 
must both evolve and go back and forth between participants, as they mutually 
ensure that the others with whom they are intending and acting are indeed ‘do-
ing their parts’ as each individual does their own part, and as those ‘parts’ 
themselves evolve in function of the shared goal. However, Tuomela is careful 
to warn us, this transparency is conceptually and normatively demanded by the 
                                                     
1 Another consideration here is whether the ‘group ethos’ includes concrete shared 
goals that could constitute the objective(s) of the forms of collective agency Tuomela 
aims to explain. 
2 Cf. Tuomela 2013, 40ff. 
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participants’ having of the intention to act collectively, but is not always nec-
essarily acted upon. It thus allows for different strengths or levels of reciproc-
ity — namely where this monitoring of the commitment is or is not accom-
plished to some greater or lesser extent. That is, this monitoring is only 
obliged, but not presupposed to be enforced. Nonetheless, there always re-
mains, and has to remain, an opportunity for participants involved in the col-
lective agency to hold each other accountable for their roles and parts, duties 
and rights, since the collective commitment (especially because its inclusion 
of social commitment) gives all group members “joint authority” and makes 
them accountable to each other. 
What does all this “actually amount to” in terms of collective agency 
from an experiential or qualitative perspective (if we think back to León and 
Zahavi’s question from earlier)? What does it lead to in terms of a perspective 
on (shared) freedom? An attractive feature of Tuomela’s account is the way in 
which it offers a rich taxonomy of and philosophical underpinning for many 
different forms of collective agency, according to a number of different com-
binations and strengths of we-mode and I-mode we-intentions, among other 
variables that he introduces. For instance, for persons involved in organising 
social-communal initiatives (such as the many ‘climate-neutral endeavours’ 
going on right now in many urban and rural communities around the world), 
such organisers may witness and may also want to encourage through their 
efforts a multitude of forms of participation in the collective action, i.e their 
initiative. These may range from more token forms of participation (wearing a 
badge, signing up for a newsletter) to more creative and demanding ones, all 
of which community organisers and campaigners today sometimes classify ac-
cording to a ‘ladder of participation’1. In this respect, Tuomela can be seen to 
offer an elegant and detailed explanation of the internal differences between 
these forms of participation, and of what might be required in one form but not 
another. On the other hand, we cannot be blind to the fact that Tuomela does 
not remain value-neutral in his explanations. Certain types of collective agency 
are more truly ‘collective’ than others, insofar as, in his view, only the we-
mode we-intention achieves what he considers as a ‘strong we’ or as “ideal” 
collective agency (Tuomela 2013). This ‘strong we’ occurs namely in in-
stances where social expectations and pressures with a normative force within 
collective agency are not only generated but also enforced (via transparent, 
reciprocal monitoring), thereby bringing about a lived notion of ‘togetherness’, 
of “standing or falling together,” of being “in the same boat”. Because, accord-
                                                     
1 Cf. Arnstein 1969. 
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ing to Tuomela (2007, 282), “mere reciprocity is not sufficient to generate sus-
tained cooperation”, such cooperation requires “strong reciprocity”; where the 
latter is especially in his understanding not only “a predisposition to cooperate 
with others” but especially a predisposition “to punish (at personal cost, if nec-
essary) those who violate the norms of cooperation” (2007, 150). “Strong rec-
iprocity” thereby requires “altruistic punishers”, that is, individuals highly en-
gaged in and committed to enforcing the collective and social commitments 
(ibid.). 
At the same time, however, this ‘strong we’ seems to come at a cost, 
and there can be no mistaking it; its name is freedom or autonomy that partic-
ipants may have or experience. That is to say, freedom within collective 
agency can only exist as a kind of trade-off or at best a kind of indeterminacy 
or leftover, the more the mechanisms of collective commitments are enforced, 
that is, the stronger the we is (qua we-mode we-intention) in collective agency. 
How might that trade-off be understood? To be clear, it should be remarked 
that Tuomela does not seem openly opposed to any form of freedom in his 
account of collective agency. This means that freedom must be accorded a 
special place in his account and that from the outset he envisions its relation-
ship to collective agency as quite complex. This can be seen in the way free-
dom for Tuomela is both a condition and something given up in collective 
agency. On the one hand, freedom appears to be a necessary condition because, 
according to Tuomela, a defining feature of collective agency in its most basic 
form is that individuals enter into and participate in the collective agency will-
ingly (2013, 15). Tuomela’s basis for this claim is methodological and formal-
istic; insofar as the explanandum of his account is collective, i.e. shared, 
agency from the perspective of necessary and sufficient intentions that indi-
viduals have and act upon, that account must as a rule exclude any social phe-
nomena by which persons would be brought to act in line with each other by 
external, situational factors, such as duress, force, or what he calls “external 
coercion”. At the same time however, he also suggests that any person entering 
into and participating in collective agency must be amenable to, if not equally 
open to participate in, what he calls ‘internal coercion’1. Tuomela gives him-
self a rather wide berth on what this does not mean. Namely, he remarks, hold-
ing a gun to someone’s head would not fall under it (2007, 15). Nonetheless, 
                                                     
1 Cf. Tuomela 2013, 17: “A paradigmatic we-mode group is democratic and autono-
mous (free from external domination), able to decide about its internal affairs (e.g. its 
ethos and other goals and views). This is compatible with such a group still being 
internally unfree concerning its member freedom (e.g. some members may try to use 
power to coerce others and in other ways to prevent their freedom of action)”. 
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the clear implication is that a participant in collective agency must surrender 
their autonomy, which he terms their ‘metaphysical freedom’, in order to form 
part of the ‘strong we.’ This requirement goes hand in hand with what we dis-
cussed as the social commitment ‘within’ or entailed by collective commit-
ment above; as we saw, the chief manner in which Tuomela proposes to un-
derstand how an individual might be committed to others is vis-à-vis a surren-
der of one’s freedom. Such a surrender makes possible the reproaching and 
enforcing reciprocity that bonds or glues members of collective agency by en-
suring that all the members of the collective agency are doing their parts, fall-
ing in line or meshing like so many cogs and gears. Yet what happens to one’s 
own sense of freedom, for instance with respect to the how one might deliber-
ate about and act upon one’s own role and obligations in function of a shared 
goal with others?  Tuomela (2013, 17) answers as follows:  
A paradigmatic we-mode group is democratic and autonomous (free from ex-
ternal domination), able to decide about its internal affairs (e.g., its ethos and 
other goals and views). This is compatible with such a group still being inter-
nally unfree concerning its member freedom (e.g., some members may try to 
use power to coerce others and in other ways to prevent their freedom of ac-
tion). 
That is, any such freedom becomes a mere “desideratum” (2013, 171), a per-
haps felicitous nice-to-have, which is surplus if not extrinsic to the require-
ments of collective agency1. 
There would be further ways to explore more the repercussions of 
Tuomela’s account2, and we should not fail to notice that a further sort of com-
mitment has crept into his account of collective agency, namely a sort of ‘un-
freedom’ commitment3. With this finding in hand, though, we want to turn to 
                                                     
1 Cf. Tuomela 2013, 170: “[The] giving up part of one’s de facto authority is typical 
and indeed necessary for much of social life. A requirement of autonomy in an onto-
logical sense (that is, free from contextual empirical constraints) or in a moral sense 
can still be retained, but rather as a desideratum than a right that others are obligated 
to respect in all situations.” 
2 For instance, in terms of how Tuomela describes the ‘we-feeling’ or in terms of how 
he understands the charity or altruism of the ‘altruistic punishers’ upholding the social 
commitment.  
3 For a helpful discussion of the role of normativity or enforceability in Tuomela’s 
account of collective intentionality and collective agency, cf. Schweikard 2017.  Our 
discussion differs from Schweikard’s in that he is interested in the conflicts of obliga-
tion that may arise, for instance, between a person having individual and group-reasons 
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a Sartrean account that seems in many ways diametrically opposed to that of 
Tuomela’s. One key way in which this is apparent is the manner in which Sar-
tre insists on how a sense of freedom is not a matter of a trade-off or something 
left over, once other conditions of collective agency are fulfilled; rather, Sartre 
insists, a form of freedom constitutes the core feature of collective agency. 
This emphasis surfaces time and again in his discussion of the group-in-fusion 
and its path to common or collective action1. Given such claims on Sartre’s 
part, there is a question here. What should we make of this different approach 
by Sartre? Does anything back it up? Indeed, one objection that might be raised 
at this point is that there is a kind of philosophical ruse in even asking about 
freedom within collective agency in the first place. This objection might runs 
as follows; collective agency, as we have already seen, seems to exclude any 
forms of human behaviour involving involuntary compulsion. That distinction 
is one of the ways by which we know what we are concerned with; it is one of 
the basic criteria for identifying collective agency in the first place.  In other 
words, collective agency by definition always has to involve a ‘willing’ on the 
part of its participants, under some form or other to be specified (‘doing one’s 
part,’ etc.). Insofar, then, as this willing is necessary to any collective agency, 
there is not only no tension between collective agency and freedom, but also 
no problem of freedom ‘within’ it. Freedom conditions and thus is a part of 
collective agency ex hypothesi. 
There are different responses available to this ‘conditions of participa-
tion’ objection, consideration of which can shed some light on Sartre’s ap-
proach. One response concerns whether such willing on the part of individuals 
to participate in collective agency should be understood (strictly or partly) as 
a willing to give up one’s freedom; might it not be understood as a change in 
or development of one’s freedom? A second, more pointed response is that 
even if such an objection were true, it still would miss the mark; it would not 
tell us anything about whether there is such a thing as freedom within collec-
tive agency or about what it would look like. This is because, whatever the 
case may be, the objection only concerns (the conditions of) an individual’s 
openness and desire to participate in collective agency, but not the realisation 
or embodiment of that participation in a shared intention to act together with 
                                                     
to act, and whether and how well Tuomela might be able to accommodate such con-
flicts. 
1 Cf. Sartre 2004, 401: “But the essential characteristic of the fused group is the sudden 
resurrection of freedom”; “[…] in the group-in-fusion, the leader is always me, there 
are no others, I am sovereign and I discover in my own praxis the orders which come 
from the other thirds” (ibid., 396). Cf. ibid., 402-406. 
Bull. anal. phén. XVI 2 (2020) 
https://popups.uliege.be/1782-2041/ © 2020 ULiège BAP 
 
126
others. In other words, the only thing this objection shows is that an individ-
ual’s (free) willingness to participate ought not be confused with what that 
individual will share and participate in through collective agency.  
In our view, such responses go some ways towards pointing at what 
Sartre is after, and provide a motivation for investigating his account further, 
but there is no getting around the fact that his position on the freedom within 
collective agency remains poorly understood, perhaps because it is hard to un-
derstand in the first place. Is his notion of such freedom merely a historical 
curiosity, or perhaps some sort of a conceptual chimera? Is it maybe the con-
ceptual manifestation of a certain political agenda on Sartre’s part coming out 
in his attempt to offer an account of sociality that goes beyond some of the 
gaps of his earlier philosophy? Or is there something to it, something that can 
still speak to and indeed inform contemporary social ontology debates? In the 
ensuing, we aim to outline some of the main arguments behind Sartre taking 
such a position, and perhaps even point to some questions they might raise for 
Tuomela’s account. There are two areas in particular that are worth looking at; 
on the one hand, the relations one participant has to other participants in col-
lective agency, and on the other, the awareness of efficacy or action that ac-
companies collective agency. In both of these areas, Sartre may be seen to find 
some interesting considerations for thinking why there may be freedom within 
collective agency. 
In the Critique of Dialectical Reason, the chief but not sole work by 
Sartre dealing with such issues, we can find a substantial portion of his remarks 
on the role of freedom in collective freedom in the section in which he deals 
with the emergence of group phenomena in everyday life, which he terms 
‘groups-in-fusion’. In aiming at a non-circular description of such phenomena, 
he nominates certain conditions for the emergence of collective agency. 
Namely, there needs to be the following1: 1° common needs, something indi-
viduals can address together; 2° common objectives, something individuals 
can reach together; 3° common praxis, something individuals can do together. 
Much could be said about this structure and about how these conditions 
relate to each other; for our current purposes, it suffices to note that, through 
an analysis of such conditions, Sartre is interested in a notion of groups that is 
more inclusive and internally differentiated than one that would, for instance, 
split groups into two basic classes of “teams, committees, clubs, and courts” 
and of “racial groups, gender groups, ethnic groups […]”2. Moreover, we wish 
to highlight the significance of the requirement, ‘common’, in each of these 
                                                     
1 Sartre 2004, 350, 446. 
2 This is a classification proposed by Ritchie (2015, 314). 
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conditions. It signifies not just a dependence on others but also a way of being 
or interacting with others, akin to the ‘glue’ or ‘bond’ previously mentioned 
vis-à-vis Tuomela. However, there is a question for Sartre regarding just how 
to frame this commonness, which is to say, this way of being together and 
interacting with others with respective to needs, objectives, and actions. Sartre 
states in fairly clear terms that he does not think it ought to be understood in 
terms of either solidarity or cooperation (2004, 395), for that would be to pre-
suppose the very thing he aims to explain. Nor is it any kind of “metaphysical 
reality” (ibid., 404), “inert statute of unity” (ibid., 391), or “single quality” of 
each participant’s act(s) within collective agency1. Sartre is then correspond-
ingly agnostic about whether ‘closeness’, as a sort of “gelatinous glue” or bond 
between participants (ibid., 395), is the right paradigm for grasping their ‘com-
monness’ of need, objective, and action, and perhaps more importantly, for 
grasping the character and presence of these others with and to whom Tuomela 
thinks we commit in collective agency. For instance, in crowded cities, in busy 
busses and trains, we may seem close, all too close to others. As has been 
shown by e.g. Goffman (1956, 66 ff.), we may even be seen, on account of 
such (spatial) proximity, to coordinate with others constantly and in very pre-
cise and definite ways, such as the manner in which we manage our body space 
and body orientation in relation to them, and in the way each communicates 
their intentions to others around them2. There is in such an observation the 
basis for voicing a Sartrean sort of question to Tuomela; such coordination 
together with others seems to have traits similar to the social commitment and 
its enforcement (namely a commitment to the other to realise the goal, appar-
ently shared by each of us, of having as comfortable a commute as possible)3. 
                                                     
1 On the ‘distributivism’ or the individualism of Sartre’s approach to groups, cf. Caws 
2014, 220-222. 
2 Goffman’s term for this is “body gloss” (1971, 128). 
3 One may of course dispute whether our example of the commuters exhibits anything 
resembling a shared goal, and Tuomela if not others certainly would. In defence of our 
interpretation we would point to the facets of such behaviours that show how commut-
ers do not merely treat each other as turnstiles, poles or doors, etc., to be navigated in 
the pursuit of each person’s own individual ends. Thus, in certain contexts commuters 
may signal each other of their intentions in both subtle and explicit manners (packing 
up one’s belongings, direct a glance at a door), and anticipate and accommodate the 
intentions of other commuters (shifting one’s bag or one’s feet, move out of each 
other’s way). It seems reductive to assume that both the purpose of such behaviours 
and the manner of their execution could be explained simply by how each individual 
is steering others around them in function of their own private (i.e. non-shared) goals.  
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All the same, such behaviours evince, as our daily commutes show, very little 
‘true’ or ideal commonness or togetherness1. 
Sartre’s thinking runs in a rather different direction, and may even seem 
idealistic. Distilled to its essential feature, his argument is that in the most basic 
and paradigmatic cases of collective agency, which he calls the “common ac-
tion” conditioned by the factors outlined above, there are no others, or that 
others disappear. The commonness Sartre aims to describe is in other words 
one in which each participant does not care about others at all and has little 
regard for them. Instead, what each participant in the common action is most 
concerned with is the thing, i.e. the cause, risk, danger, emergency, or event at 
hand. In line with the methodological solipsism which seems to be de rigueur 
in contemporary social ontology, this caring and acting is very much an indi-
vidual experience on the part of each participant — as if in collective agency, 
for the first time, one can truly care about something, and not only care, but 
actually do something about it as well. Sartre’s position — about the kind of 
others with whom we interact in collective agency, and about the manner in 
which we do so — shows a kind of scepticism on his part about the importance 
and the role of sharing, if not also empathy, in collective agency2, and is con-
sonant with his earlier attempts to elaborate human intersubjectivity not on the 
basis of any Husserlian or Schelerian models. Yet what then could the togeth-
erness of collective agency be about, if not some fundamental sort of sharing? 
He will argue that there is another option, little explored in the history of phi-
losophy. The key for understanding collective agency is not some way in 
which others appear in, are related to (e.g. via intentions), or are interacted 
with in a special way. It rather lies in the way that others recede or disappear 
in function of collective agency; that is to say, the way in which they become 
thirds. 
Thirds are, in the first place, others of one’s others; the term ‘third’ or 
‘third party’ is a way of denoting how certain people remain outside or beyond 
our sphere of interactions, in either temporary or permanent fashion3. An indi-
vidual does not see or know thirds; they remain ‘submerged’ in each person’s 
situation (Sartre 2004, 366). The invisibility of thirds stems from their status 
as the underlying ‘origo’ from whom and to whom practical possibilities for 
action in any given individual’s situation refer. In other words, thirds may be 
                                                     
1 Cf. Sartre 2004, 350 on how having a “common object” does very little to unite 
individuals. 
2 For instance, insofar as every form of empathy must involve a self-other relation. On 
this point, cf. Zahavi 2014, 138.  
3 On the invisibility of thirds, cf. Sartre 2004, 366. 
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thought of as predetermining the scope and limits of one’s (practical) inten-
tions in any situation that one might arrive in, like so many arrows painted on 
the tarmac of a road, lines hewn into hedges and paved into sidewalks, desire 
paths cut across swards of grass, and so on. Thirds ‘always already’ steer an 
individual’s intentions by antecedently assigning meaning to the states of af-
fairs by virtue of which each individual can express an intention to act in the 
first place. They thus remain by definition at one step removed from any such 
intention on an individual’s part. A key feature of ‘thirds’ or ‘third parties’ in 
this respect is that they are to be sharply distinguished from the ‘Others’ with 
whom an individual can have commerce during daily life. Unlike those omni-
present ‘Other’ individuals with whom one interacts and with whom each in-
dividual is in competition for a scarcity of ends, spaces, and resources (if not 
autonomy), thirds cannot be seen and cannot be visualised or imagined. On 
Sartre’s view, there can only be paintings or sculptures of, for instance, masses 
or crowds of individuals, but never of individuals related to each other as thirds 
(ibid., 374). 
In common action or collective agency, Sartre’s idea is that something 
particular happens to how an individuals relates to ‘Others’ and to ‘Thirds’. 
Namely, in contrast to Tuomela’s account which insists that others become 
more present or more prominent in collective agency, Sartre’s idea is that cer-
tain others around one cease being mere or everyday, typical ‘Others’ when 
some individuals come to truly act together or in common. Instead, for a par-
ticipant in the common action, such ‘Others’ appear under a different form, as 
a kind of ‘explicit’ third; that is to say, as a third with whom one experiences 
a connection via a common ‘origo’ of a practical possibility for action within 
one’s situation. What Sartre will highlight as support for this claim is a contrast 
between how one is typically aware of one’s actions in seriality and how a 
sense of action may be given to persons in the group-in-fusion. Namely, in the 
latter, Sartre stresses the way that, in the common action of the group-in-fu-
sion, there is a kind of indistinguishability between actions that are ‘one’s own’ 
and actions carried out by others persons around one. In the group-in-fusion, 
actions can be seemed to belong to one even if they do not originate from one, 
inasmuch as they stem from the group to which one belongs. It is as if both the 
scope of each practical intention as well as the range of possible practical in-
tentions had been greatly widened, beyond any individual’s non-shared, pri-
vate hic et nunc1. 
                                                     
1 Cf. Sartre 2004, 397 (emphasis added): “Thus, in contrast to the rout as seriality, this 
flight — which already projects itself obscurely as a means of regroupment — has 
everyone as its sovereign agent here in so far as it is common; and everyone produces 
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We can think of this point, and consider its plausibility, once more in 
terms of our example from the train station. There has been a break for all of 
us, in our daily paths. We have to stop getting in the way of each other: that is 
to say, stop appearing to each other as ‘Others’. There would have been no 
occasion for us to come together without this person’s having fallen, but some-
how also all of us chose to stop, to help, to be concerned. On a Sartrean reading 
of this situation (e.g. there are no ‘Others’ in collective agency), there is no ‘I-
thou’ relationship at this moment of coming together to help this person. The 
concern — my concern, and our concern — is this person’s having fallen, and 
it does not matter whose phone we use, who goes into the station, who picks 
up the person’s things, etc. In the specific form of interaction or reciprocity 
which occurs at that moment of helping the fallen person, it does not matter to 
whom each action belongs, or where it originates from; why not? — Because 
at this moment, ‘others’ have receded. That is, my practical possibilities and 
intentions become entangled with theirs, as theirs become mine, in a way that 
could never occur as long as they are my ‘Others’ with whom I must divide 
the world. The Sartrean basis for such an analysis draws in particular on the 
phenomenology of each person’s practical intentions in the common action; 
the individuals interrupting their commute for instance find themselves able to 
help the fallen person in a person in a novel way, one that each individual could 
not discover or intend as long as each person was acting individually. For Sar-
tre, this phenomenal awareness of an extended or empowered practical inten-
tionality — from a widened ‘origo’ as point of reference for that intentionality 
— underwrites the claim about how the people with whom I act in collective 
action have become invisible, that is, become indistinguishable from myself1. 
On account of this description of our example, we can formulate a first 
explanation for why Sartre would insist on freedom as a feature of collective 
agency. If this description is plausible, we can suggest that it may be freeing 
to find the scope and breadth of one’s practical intention significantly widened, 
such that one finds others no longer in one’s way, no longer challenging one’s 
action and one’s sovereignty. Yet why should we think that others stand in our 
way in the first place? For example, does it make any sense to think of such 
others as preventing one from helping the fallen commuter? This glimpse at 
the reasons behind Sartre’s insistence on the role of freedom within collective 
                                                     
the common meanings (significations) which come to him from everywhere either as 
certainties, by transcending them, or as free choices of means and ends.” On this point, 
cf. ibid., 379-380, 396. 
1 It is for this reason that Sartre will claim that every order and every command in the 
group seem as much to come from myself, as from anyone else (ibid., 379-380). 
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agency can be extended if we look in more detail at the sense of efficacy or 
agency that a person participating may have as a result of it. We might put this 
issue in terms akin to those of Tuomela; what does it feel like to go from an I-
intention to a we-intention, and from an I-mode-we-intention to a we-mode 
we-intention? What sort of transition or transformation of a person’s agency 
might be involved in this? This is a further area where Sartre’s original contri-
bution to an ‘experientially-focused’ explanation of collective agency can be 
seen to come into its own; this transition has to do with the manner in which a 
new or different sort of agency becomes accessible to individuals, which he 
frames as a ‘liquidation of alterity’ and of seriality. 
Sartre aims to account for the sort of sociality involved in what he calls 
the group-in-fusion as arising from another kind of collectivity, namely, seri-
ality, which itself already evinces a kind of “teleology” (2004, 395) and a cer-
tain ‘groupishness’, albeit a dissatisfying one. What is seriality about? There 
are a couple different ways of looking at it. Simplifying a great deal, one way 
to think about seriality is that it reflects a Sartrean notion of stupidity. In his 
descriptions of stupidity, Sartre often refers to how stupidity is a reversal of 
the classical notion of “mens agitat molem” (Sartre 1992, 306), “the idea be-
come matter, or matter aping the idea” (Sartre 1981, 598). In the context of 
seriality, this notion of stupidity can be understood as the way in which human 
intentions and actions in the social world become take on the properties and 
behaviours of inanimate things in the world, like chairs or rocks1. In the seri-
ality common to everyday life, however one aims to act and whatever freedom 
and individuality one may hope to express gets stuck or trapped in a kind of 
thingness or denseness of one’s social being. As just another person waiting in 
line, i.e. going through the motions and jumping through the hoops of daily 
life in and with others, one becomes part of “a collective whole that acts like a 
thing, like a material milieu where the stimuli are propagated mechanically” 
(Sartre 1968, 207)2. 
What is important to note here is that such seriality is already a kind of 
sociality from Sartre’s perspective, because it does seem to evince a form of 
sharing, perhaps not too far removed from what Tuomela denotes as the ‘I 
mode’ of the ‘we-intention’. However, the sort of sharing involved in seriality 
                                                     
1 Cf. Sartre 2004, 300, note 88: “And the attraction of racism for intelligent, well-
meaning people (for example, in the form of an innocent pride: ‘One has to admit that 
the Mediterranean races…, etc.’) is normally experienced by them as the attraction of 
stupidity, that is to say, as the secret hope that thought is a stone [la pensée comme un 
caillou]”. Cf. Sartre 1968, 95. 
2 Cf. Sartre 1968, 95. 
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is not that of an aggregate and identity of personal goals, but rather one of 
impotence. As serial beings, we are circulating with other serial beings, mov-
ing and interacting in ways governed by modern technology towards the same 
ends. But as there is a scarcity of places or a scarcity of resources, we all be-
come rivals or obstacles to each other; we are all ‘Others’; to each other, chal-
lenging and calling into question the sovereignty, that is, the power of agency 
with which we aim to act and reach our own ends. There is moreover nothing 
to be done nothing about all these obstacles and the situation of impotence they 
constitute, because every extra seat on the train, every extra resource created 
by modern technology, and so on would remain one which have to be poten-
tially competed for with ‘Others’1. As Sartre puts it, “powerlessness undergone 
is the mastic [glue] of seriality” (Sartre 1960, 2272). In seriality, action is quite 
out of one’s own hands; every doing is a non-doing, an “unfreedom” (Flynn 
1984, 114). For this reason, Sartre will speak of the loss of one’s own sense of 
agency and of one’s own sense of individuality that occurs through seriality as 
a type of (self-)alienation (2004, 337).     
In this respect, seriality is an obstacle to collective agency, and we can 
also say that for Sartre wherever we see seriality, there can be no collective 
agency. However, seriality is not just an obstacle, but also a condition for col-
lective agency, qua condition for the emergence of groups that would under-
take such agency. That is, in our alienation and the negation of our individual-
ity and freedom in seriality, Sartre would seek the necessary conditions for the 
emergence of something like a true or authentic form of sociality, the group-
in-fusion. One takeaway here is that Sartre’s account of the constitution of col-
lective agency goes hand in hand with an account of the dissolution of seriality. 
The significance of this move should not be lost on us. For Sartre, the problem 
of collective agency cannot be about how we get from or commute the distance 
from the individual or personal intention to the collective or shared one3. For 
him, it is rather about how from a certain form of sociality, albeit one in which 
we are separate but united both at once, we can get to something like a true 
                                                     
1 It is beyond our current scope to examine in depth Sartre’s notion of scarcity as an 
ontological concept. Cf. Sartre 2004, 128 ff. 
2 Here we quote and translate the French edition of the Critique of Dialectical Reason. 
Indeed, there is an error in the English translation: the entire sentence that we cite is 
omitted. 
3 Sartre’s willingness to engage in a reflection on this question, namely the social con-
ditions of collective agency, is an interesting area of his thought that seems to have no 
direct correlate in accounts such as Tuomela’s. It should be noted that Schmid (2009), 
for one, also purports to avoid this construal of the problem. 
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sociality, something like a true phenomenon of common action or together-
ness. Moreover, this dissolution of seriality, that is to say, such an account of 
the removal of a kind of impotence, may allow us to see why Sartre holds one 
of the chief features of collective agency to be the “sudden resurrection of 
freedom” and an individuation, if not type of self-awareness via participation 
within collective agency, which is impossible in seriality. 
In this connection, with an eye towards the ‘experiential dimension’ of 
collective agency, it merits mention that an adequate account of collective 
agency should also accommodate the affective or emotional dimensions of 
such agency. That is, an adequate account should allow us to understand what 
can be rewarding or meaningful about collective agency or ‘real’ common ac-
tion. This is what we might suggest some people experience as the ‘joy of 
collective agency’. The idea of collective agency as a recapturing of freedom 
and of a sense of agency in Sartre can in our view be suggestive for accounting 
for this joy, as well as allowing to understand why it may be felt, but not al-
ways. What might such joy come down to? In the first place, this joy of col-
lective agency seems to have little to do with the throes of a violent passion, 
such as the overwhelming joy experienced in romantic love, for instance, in 
those unbearable moments of happiness when it seems like one can no longer 
stand it, where one must shout one’s joy. This is not because the joy of collec-
tive agency is necessarily weaker than the former, but because this feeling does 
not come with a need to be shared or proclaimed by us. Rather the opposite; if 
this feeling is grounded in a real form of collective agency (and insofar as 
Sartre tries to make a case for distinguishing as much), there may be little need 
for it to be shared, because it would involve a togetherness already, namely the 
event of becoming thirds along with others, through which we shed our serial-
ity. On the other hand, this joy of collective agency is not a matter of self-
detachment or self-serenity, as if it is now the group, and not the self, which 
has to worry about whether to act, how, and why. Put into the language of the 
earlier Sartre, this feeling of collective agency cannot be seen as equivalent 
with a renunciation of individual desire. Instead, this joy may be described as 
an enjoyment of freedom that has come into its own or that has been instanti-
ated in a novel way through collective agency, and which goes together with a 
need to sustain one’s collective agency in and through the group. In this way, 
Sartre’s descriptions of what it is like to participate in such a group, as this 
“quasi-subject, quasi-object” (Sartre 2004, 372-373) seem to come very close 
to what in earlier work he had described as the impossible fulfillment of desire 
as the ‘in-itself-for-itself’ or elsewhere as the combination of “subjectivity” 
and “objectivity” that leads to joy (1992, 498). 
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In conclusion, it will be worthwhile to consider the extent to which we 
have responded to the call to which we referred at the beginning of this paper. 
In one regard, if we have managed to raise a certain question regarding free-
dom within collective agency, we have certainly not exhausted its possibilities 
for exploration, not even for the authors we have considered1. One item for 
further examination concerns how to continue to ‘translate’ the concepts and 
frameworks advanced by Sartre into the issues at stake in contemporary social 
ontology, inasmuch as such a process is crucial for any demonstration of the 
relevance of the former to the latter. Furthermore, it can be worthwhile to re-
consider the assumption that Tuomela’s views may count as representative of 
the concerns of social ontology, and thus that they may serve as a touchstone 
for the questions of collective freedom. Here we might wonder whether other 
authors would fare differently, insofar as not all contemporary approaches to-
day are homogeneous. This last point then points to a wider conceptual issue 
to be explored — namely, is our ability to conceptualise this question limited 
to some greater or lesser extent by the manner in which we pose the ‘collec-
tivity’ (or sharedness or groupishness) question in the first place? That is, de-
pending on whether we are methodological individualists or not, we may give 
different sorts of answers to this question. Lastly, it would be interesting to 
explore whether this question about collective freedom could serve as a moti-
vating factor or “constraint” in Paternotte’s sense (2014) for embracing one 
model or exemplar of collective agency rather than another. In our view, con-
sidering the kinds of freedom at stake within collective life, and the sorts that 
we would want to explain and vouchsafe, could provide a crucial pivot or ful-
crum from which to tilt arguments in favour of one set of proposals or another 
for how to understand how collective agency is constituted and experienced. 
Nonetheless, if we have reached some sort of positive result, it would 
have to be located in how we have looked at whether there could be ‘freedom 
within’ collective agency and what it might look like. What we have attempted 
to understand is how any such freedom creates a kind of tension for social 
ontologies reliant on mechanisms of commitment and on monitoring how ‘oth-
ers are doing their parts’, such as Tuomela’s. For him, not all types of collec-
tive agency have the same status; some are more collective or more ‘groupish’ 
                                                     
1 For instance, one further facet of the relation between Tuomela and Sartre concerns 
the manner in which Sartre describes participants in collective agency as “regulatory 
thirds” (2004, 379). It would be worthwhile to explore whether such a description 
shows a common interest of both authors in the conditions of enforcing or effecting 
the common action.  
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than others, and on his account this has everything to do with the special com-
mitments individuals not only make but also enforce in acting together. This 
position exposes a basic tension in Tuomela’s account between freedom and 
collective agency. Freedom within collective agency seems only able to exist 
and be tolerated within collective agency when the latter takes on less coordi-
nated and less cohesive forms. On the other hand, the more the goals or the 
conditions of collective agency call for greater cooperation and cohesiveness, 
the more such freedoms form a threat to that very collective agency. This find-
ing presents not only a question as to whether freedom within collective 
agency is compatible with the “strong we” of Tuomela’s proper or “ideal” col-
lective agency; it likewise raises a question about the very nature of the ‘group-
ishness’ that Tuomela purports to target. Are we a “strong we” when we are 
most concerned, or when we are least concerned with enforcing each other’s 
commitments as we act together? 
This is where our consideration of a Sartrean notion of freedom within 
collective agency came into play. With Sartre, the question is whether there is 
a form of freedom which is not only coincident with and dependent upon the 
institution of collective agency, but that is consonant with it as well (contra 
Tuomela). If for Tuomela we can only act towards a common goal together 
insofar as we give up our freedom, for Sartre we can only act towards a com-
mon goal together insofar as we have the freedom to, namely, that we are em-
powered to do so. This last means: insofar as each participant in the common 
action does not get in the way of any other participant, such that each finds the 
scope of their practical intentions enlarged by a wider frame of reference for 
possible ends and goals. Such freedom, we argued, is what Sartre appears to 
describe as the “common freedom” enjoyed by participants in the group-in-
fusion, where participants experience a freedom unavailable to them outside 
the common action (i.e. in seriality); that of feeling any one of their own ac-
tions could be substituted by actions by any of the other participants. This is, 
in other words, a freedom from each participants’ own sense of impotence in 
the serial world and a freedom to accomplish more via common action, which 
at the same time does not cancel or invalidate their participation in the group-
in-fusion. A further problem, however, is the transience or instability of ‘com-
mon action’ — and any such freedom going along with it — on Sartre’s ac-
count. As he readily concedes, any such experience of freedom is quickly 
threatened by the very conditions of collective agency which give rise to it in 
the first place1. This is where Tuomela may offer an important rejoinder to 
                                                     
1 Sartre 2004, 420. For an insightful discussion of this issue, cf. De Warren 2016. 
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Sartre; if such common freedom is indeed so unstable, is it any kind of note-
worthy freedom whatsoever for collective agents? 
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